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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
Across the globe there is a growing divide between the wellbeing of those at the top of the 
socioeconomic ladder and those at the bottom. Despite tremendous economic growth, more than 
75 percent of people in developing countries are living in societies that are more unequal today 
than they were in the 1990s. The link in social and economic wellbeing across generations makes 
redistributive policy design extremely challenging. Thus, it is important that we look beyond 
traditional tax-and-transfer programs to find new approaches to supporting disadvantaged 
families. To this end, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms underpinning the transmission of 
disadvantage from parents to their children (intergenerational disadvantage). 
We examine the factors underlying intergenerational disadvantage by analyzing the correlation 
between parents’ and their children’s receipt of social assistance across different social assistance 
payments. We use administrative social security (Centrelink) records linked over time and within 
families; giving us detailed social assistance trajectories – across the entire social safety net – for a 
birth cohort of young adults and their families over an 18-year period. Our strategy is to exploit 
differences in how strongly linked is the receipt of social assistance from parents to children across 
programs – which differ in their target population and eligibility rules – to learn about how 
disadvantage is transmitted. 
We find that young people are not only more likely (1.8 times) to need social assistance if their 
parents have a history of receiving social assistance; they also need more intensive support, 
receiving an additional $12,000 of social assistance over an 8-year period. The intergenerational 
correlation is particularly strong in the case of disability payments, payments for those with caring 
responsibilities, and parenting payments for single parents. Parental disability and single 
parenthood are the clearest pathways through which disadvantage is being passed from 
Australian parents to their children. In contrast, other forms of disadvantage, in particular those 
stemming from parents’ poor labor market outcomes, seem to be easier for young people to 
overcome. Parental disadvantage may be more harmful to children’s later life outcomes if it is 
more strongly driven by circumstances rather than personal choice. 
Our results suggest that the playing field is not level for all children. Disparities in young people’s 
outcomes are not simply the result of their – or their parents’ – differential efforts; unequal 
opportunities also play a critical role.  Greater policy effort must be devoted to leveling the playing 
field for children growing up in particularly vulnerable families. 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
Deborah Cobb-Clark is a Professor of Applied Economics at the University of Sydney. She is Director of the Program in 
Gender and Families at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn, Germany; CI and Leader of the Human Capabilities 
Research Program in the ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course; and an elected Fellow of the 
Academy of Social Sciences in Australia. Deborah’s research agenda centres on the effect of social policy on issues such as 
immigration, sexual and racial harassment, health, intergenerational disadvantage, education, and child development. In 
particular, she is the lead CI in the innovative Youth in Focus Project which is analysing the pathways through which social and 
economic disadvantage is transmitted from parents to children in Australia. She has published more than seventy five 
academic articles in leading international journals such as American Economic Review, Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Human Resources, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, and Labour Economics. Email: deborah.cobb-clark@sydney.edu.au  
Sarah Dahmann joined the University of Sydney as a Research Fellow at the School of Economics in March 2017. She 
completed her PhD in Economics at Freie Universität Berlin, focusing on education economics. In her dissertation she 
identified causal effects of schooling on skills and health. Before joining the University of Sydney, Sarah worked at the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) in the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) department and was a member of the DIW 
Berlin Graduate Center. Sarah’s current research interests are intergenerational mobility, social and economic disadvantage, 
skill formation, and policy evaluation. Email: sarah.dahmann@sydney.edu.au  
Nicolas Salamanca joined the Melbourne Institute as a Research fellow in August 2014 and is part of the Australian Research 
Council Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course. His previous research focused on the 
measurement of economic preferences and their impact on household portfolio choice. Nicolas’ current research topics 
include economic preferences, socioeconomic disadvantage, discrimination, household portfolio choice, background risk, and 
retirement decisions. His main research interests are household decision-making, behavioral economics, labor economics, and 
applied microeconometrics. He has recently published articles in the Economic Journal and the B.E. Journal of Theoretical 
Economics. Email: n.salamanca@unimelb.edu.au  
Anna Zhu joined the Melbourne Institute in June 2014 and is part of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for 
Children and Families over the Life Course. Anna specializes in the fields of empirical labour economics and applied 
econometrics, researching topics on marital separation, the income support behaviour of single mothers, poverty and 
deprivation. Her PhD topic was on maternal employment and the care of children. Anna’s research interests include maternal 
employment, youth disadvantage, child health and well-being and cross-country analyses. Email: anna.zhu@unimelb.edu.au  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The data used for this research come from the Youth in Focus Project which is jointly funded by the 
Australian Government and the Australian Research Council (Grant Number LP0347164) and carried out by the Australian 
National University. The research was also supported by the Australian Research Council through a Discovery Program Grant 
(DP140102614) and the Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course (project number CE140100027). 
The Centre is administered by the Institute for Social Science Research at The University of Queensland, with nodes at The 
University of Western Australia, The University of Melbourne and The University of Sydney. The views expressed herein are 
solely those of the authors. Contact Author: Nicolas Salamanca (n.salamanca@unimelb.edu.au), Melbourne Institute of 
Applied Economic and Social Research. Level 5, FBE Building, 111 Barry St., University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, 
Australia. 
DISCLAIMER: The content of this Working Paper does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Life Course Centre. Responsibility 
for any information and views expressed in this Working Paper lies entirely with the author(s). 
(ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course) 
Institute for Social Science Research, The University of Queensland (administration node) 
UQ Long Pocket Precinct, Indooroopilly, Qld 4068, Telephone: +61 7 334 67477 
Email: lcc@uq.edu.au, Web: www.lifecoursecentre.org.au 
Abstract 
We use variation in the extent of generational persistence across social assistance payments to 
shed light on the factors leading to intergenerational disadvantage. Our administrative data 
come from the Australian social security system and provide us with detailed social assistance 
trajectories – across the entire social safety net – for a birth cohort of young people and their 
families over an 18-year period. We find that young people are 1.8 times more likely to need 
social assistance if their parents have a history of receiving social assistance themselves. 
These young people also receive more intensive support; an additional $12,000 over an 8-year 
period. The intergenerational correlation is particularly strong in the case of disability 
payments, payments for those with caring responsibilities, and parenting payments for single 
parents. Disadvantage stemming from parents’ poor labor market outcomes seems to be easier 
for young people to overcome. This suggests that parental disadvantage may be more harmful 
to children’s later life outcomes if it is more strongly driven by circumstances rather than 
personal choice.     
 
Keywords: intergenerational correlations; socioeconomic disadvantage; social assistance; 
Australia 
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INTRODUCTION 
Across the globe there is a growing divide between the wellbeing of those at the top of the 
socioeconomic ladder and those at the bottom. Despite tremendous economic growth, more 
than 75 percent of people in developing countries are living in societies that are more unequal 
today than they were in the 1990s (UNDP 2013). In OECD countries, the ratio of average 
disposable income in the top versus the bottom decile now stands at 9.5; up from around seven 
in the 1980s (Keeley 2015). Today the richest eight percent of the world’s population earn half 
of the world’s total income, leaving the remaining 92 percent of people with the other half 
(Milanovic 2012). The top one percent owns about 40 percent of the world’s assets, while the 
poorest half of the world’s population owns at most one percent (UNDP 2013).  
Rising inequality pulls the rungs of the socioeconomic ladder further apart, reducing 
intergenerational mobility by making it harder for poor children to avoid becoming poor adults. 
The link in social and economic wellbeing across generations makes redistributive policy 
design extremely challenging. Governments largely focus on individuals – not families – and 
attempt to bring about social change by taxing one group (the advantaged) and transferring to 
another (the disadvantaged). However, “there is little support for the claim that untargeted 
income transfer policies to poor families significantly boost child outcomes” (Heckman and 
Mosso 2014 p. 2). Thus, it is important that we look beyond traditional tax-and-transfer 
programs to find new approaches to supporting disadvantaged families. The U.K. is responding 
by undertaking an independent review of poor children’s life chances in an attempt to identify 
policy options (Field 2010), while in New Zealand and Australia social safety nets are being 
redesigned to make greater investments in people who have the highest chances of experiencing 
life-long disadvantage. The goal is to not only reduce the fiscal burden of social assistance, but 
also to increase economic efficiency by ensuring that everyone’s capabilities are productively 
utilized. To this end, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms underpinning intergenerational 
persistence in social and economic welfare (Corak 2006; Black and Devereux 2011).    
The objective of this paper is to examine the factors underlying intergenerational 
disadvantage by analyzing variation in the degree of generational correlation across different 
social assistance payments. We focus our study on the Australian safety net because it provides 
a particularly interesting case for studying the issues at hand. Australian social policy is 
determined at the national level under the auspices of several key policy departments; it is then 
administered by the Department of Human Services (DHS) through a single central agency 
known as Centrelink. The advantage of these institutional arrangements for our purposes is that 
they result in DHS maintaining an administrative database that includes payment records for 
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the universe of all Australians receiving any form of social security payment from the 
government. Some of these payments can be characterized as social assistance (welfare); others 
have either no or only a weak income test, making them nearly universal for families with 
children. We use administrative social security (Centrelink) records linked over time and within 
families; giving us detailed social assistance trajectories – across the entire social safety net – 
for a birth cohort of young adults and their families over an 18-year period. Our strategy is to 
exploit variation in the degree of generational correlation across social programs – which differ 
in their target population and eligibility rules – to draw conclusions about how disadvantage is 
transmitted from parents to children.  
Our work is an important extension of the literature that seeks to isolate the mechanisms 
behind social and economic mobility. Researchers have analyzed heterogeneity in the degree 
of intergenerational mobility across time (e.g., Gottschalk 1996; Beaulieu et al. 2005; 
Ekhaugen 2009); geographic areas (e.g., Corak 2006, 2013; Chetty et al. 2014); or family 
structure (e.g., Björklund et al. 2006, 2007) to rule some mechanisms into the possibility set 
and others out. We are the first to address this issue by exploiting disparity in intergenerational 
mobility across social assistance programs. In effect, we use the targeted nature of various 
social assistance programs – each designed to address different forms of disadvantage – to draw 
inferences about the process through which social and economic disadvantage is passed from 
Australian parents to their children. Differences in intergenerational mobility across the 
extensive (simple receipt) and intensive (total dollars) margins of social assistance highlight 
the effects of sustained exposure to disadvantage; while our single-country analysis effectively 
controls for the broader institutional context (e.g., labor markets, health and educational 
systems, social norms).    
Importantly, we circumvent many of the data limitations that have plagued researchers 
in the past. Previous studies demonstrate the sensitivity of intergenerational mobility estimates 
to the way that they are constructed. Short observation windows (Page 2004; Mazumder 2005) 
and attenuation bias due to measurement error in the outcomes of both generations (Solon 
1992; Zimmerman 1992; Bowles and Gintis 2002) or the use of noisy proxies (e.g., income, 
occupation, education) to capture social and economic status (Clark and Cummins 2015) both 
lead to smaller estimates of intergenerational persistence – thus overstating social and 
economic mobility. Estimates may also be subject to recall bias as many people find it difficult 
to accurately report the nature of the benefits that they have received (Pepper 2000). Our data 
capture the universe of Australians receiving social assistance. They are drawn from the 
Australian government’s administrative system and span an 18-year period allowing us to 
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avoid any biases associated with measurement error, recall issues, sample attrition, or short 
study periods. Our large sample sizes make it possible to precisely estimate differences in 
economic mobility across narrowly-defined benefit types. 
Our research contributes to the broader debate on whether the playing field is uneven; 
that is, whether equality of opportunity is becoming simply an elusive goal.1 Equality of 
opportunity is often described as “seeking to offset differences in outcomes attributable to luck, 
but not those differences in outcomes for which individuals are responsible” (Roemer and 
Trannoy 2016 p. 1289).2 Importantly, measures of generational correlations are in and of 
themselves not very helpful in forming judgements about the extent to which children face 
equal opportunities. Sorting this out requires that we distinguish the influence of differential 
circumstances (luck) – for which people should be compensated – from the influence of 
differences in personal choices (effort) – for which they should not (see Corak 2013; Jusot et 
al. 2013). We argue that some social programs are primarily designed to insure people from 
bad luck (e.g., disability benefits); others (e.g., unemployment benefits, parenting payments) 
also reflect important choices that people have made. Understanding how generational 
correlations vary across social assistance programs is therefore useful in distinguishing the 
relative importance of circumstances versus choice in intergenerational disadvantage.3  
Administrative data linking the receipt of social assistance across generations – such as 
we analyze here – are rare (Corak 2006; Dahl et al. 2014; Mitnik et al. 2015) – yet they are 
proving to be very powerful. In the U.S., researchers are using administrative data to develop 
new insights into social and economic mobility (e.g., Mazumder 2005; Chetty et al. 2014; 
Johnson et al. 2015), while the Australian and New Zealand governments are exploiting 
administrative data to conduct actuarial analyses of people’s statistical risk of long-term benefit 
use in the hopes that targeted investments (social interventions) might reduce the cost of 
providing social assistance (Caspi et al. 2016; Fraser-Jones and Tabarias 2016; PWC 2016). 
Our work investigates mobility across the entire social safety net – not simply an isolated 
program – thus offering a broad perspective on what it means to be disadvantaged. 
Socioeconomic disadvantage is about more than simply having low income; it is also 
characterized by “poverty of experience, influence, and expectation” (Corak 2006 p. 171).  
                                                          
1 Chetty et al. (2014) argue that the consequences of the birth lottery are more important today than they were in 
the past.  
2 Roemer and Trannoy (2016) discuss the philosophical origins of equality of opportunity – as distinct from 
equality of outcomes – as a principle of social justice.  
3 See Mahler and Ramos (2017) who discuss the alternative approaches economists have used to operationalize 
the notion of equality of opportunity.   
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We find that young people are not only more likely (1.8 times) to need social assistance 
if their parents have a history of receiving social assistance; they also need more intensive 
support, receiving an additional $12,000 of social assistance over an 8-year period. The 
intergenerational correlation is particularly strong in the case of disability payments, payments 
for those with caring responsibilities, and parenting payments for single parents. Parental 
disability and single parenthood are the clearest pathways through which disadvantage is being 
passed from Australian parents to their children. In contrast, other forms of disadvantage, in 
particular those stemming from parents’ poor labor market outcomes, seem to be easier for 
young people to overcome. This suggests that parental disadvantage may be more harmful to 
children’s later life outcomes if it is more strongly driven by circumstances rather than personal 
choice. 
 
 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
Social scientists have a long tradition of demonstrating that socioeconomic status is passed 
from parents to their children. Intergenerational correlations have been observed in numerous 
domains including in economic resources (wealth, earnings, and income); educational 
attainment (e.g., Björklund and Salvanes 2011); health status (e.g., Black and Devereux 2011; 
Thompson 2014); financial decisions (e.g., Li 2014; Kriener et al. 2016; Frimmel et al. 2017); 
and consumption patterns (e.g., Charles et al. 2014). The existence of intergenerational 
relationships in numerous – often quite specific – domains indicates that many factors may be 
responsible for tying children’s life chances to the family circumstances into which they are 
born.  
If children “largely ‘inherit’ their parents’ socioeconomic status” (d’Addio 2007 p. 68), 
then it is not particularly surprising that there is also an intergenerational link in welfare 
dependency.4 Research has centered on estimating the within-benefit correlation in social 
assistance; that is, the extent to which adult children are more likely to receive a particular 
benefit if their parents received the same benefit while they were growing up. Early evidence 
of intergenerational welfare dependency in the United States comes mainly from the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program which between 1935 and 1996 provided 
                                                          
4 For reviews of the literature on the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status generally see Solon 
(1999, 2002); Corak (2006); d’Addio (2007); and Black and Devereux (2011). For reviews of the literature on 
intergenerational welfare receipt see Moffitt (1992); Page (2004); and Black and Devereux (2011).  
5 
 
basic income support to low-income families – primarily single mothers – raising dependent 
children. The general conclusion is that children growing up in AFDC-reliant families had a 
substantially higher probability of receiving AFDC themselves (see Gottschalk 1992; Moffitt 
1992; Page 2004 for reviews).5 More recent evidence demonstrates that intergenerational 
reliance on social assistance is not simply a U.S. phenomenon. Disability benefits are correlated 
across generations in Norway (Bratberg et al. 2015; Dahl et al. 2014) as well as in the United 
States (Deshpande 2016). Sons’ receipt of unemployment insurance is correlated with that of 
their fathers in both Canada and Sweden (Corak et al. 2004), while there is evidence of an 
intergenerational correlation in social assistance (income support) in Québec (Beaulieu et al. 
2005) and the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway) (Stenberg 2000; Moisio et al. 
2015).            
In the first instance, these within-benefit correlations reflect an intergenerational link 
in the specific circumstances – e.g., having dependent children, being unemployed, becoming 
disabled – that lead people in low-income families to be eligible for particular programs. At 
the same time, there is a broader institutional context; families, education and health systems, 
labor markets, and tax and transfer policy all interact to drive the extent to which children’s 
opportunities and outcomes depend on their family background (Corak 2013). Consequently, 
the way that social and economic policy is designed, delivered, and funded matters for 
intergenerational mobility (Solon 2004; d’Addio 2007).  
From a policy perspective, it is therefore important to distinguish between “poverty 
traps” and “welfare cultures”. Poverty traps arise from an intergenerational correlation in low 
income which – because welfare eligibility is means-tested – can produce an intergenerational 
correlation in welfare receipt. A welfare culture, sometimes referred to as a “welfare trap”, 
occurs when some aspect of the social assistance system itself leads parental welfare receipt to 
be associated with children’s welfare receipt.6 Poverty traps argue for a focus on poverty itself, 
while welfare cultures suggest a redesign of the way that social assistance is delivered.  
Isolating the influence of social assistance from the influence of poverty is not easy, 
however. The most compelling approach is to exploit experimental variation in access to social 
assistance within a group of equally disadvantaged families. Dahl et al. (2014), for example, 
                                                          
5 Evidence of an intergenerational correlation in AFDC participation was in part the impetus for a major reform 
of U.S. welfare programs – the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 
1996 – which targeted the “culture of welfare”. The legislation refers in its findings to the fact that “children born 
into families receiving welfare assistance are 3 times more likely to be on welfare when they reach adulthood than 
children not born into families receiving welfare” (Government Printing Office 1996).   
6 Levine and Zimmerman (1996) provide an excellent discussion of these issues. 
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use the random assignment of Norwegian disability insurance (DI) applicants to appeal judges 
– who systematically differ in their leniency – to demonstrate that granting parents access to 
disability benefits increases their adult-children’s participation in the DI system over the next 
five years by six percentage points. Similarly, Dahl and Gielen (2016) find that Dutch children 
of parents who had their disability benefits cut or stopped after a major policy reform are less 
likely to receive disability benefits themselves as adults. In contrast, Edmark and Hanspers 
(2015) estimate the effect of short-term welfare spells in Sweden on children’s welfare receipt 
in adulthood. Although there is a substantial intergenerational correlation in welfare 
dependency, the authors find no evidence of a causal impact once they account for unobserved 
heterogeneity using sibling fixed effects.7 The range of settings, like these, in which 
experimental variation in social assistance can be combined with information on 
intergenerational benefit receipt has been quite limited, however. Experimental estimates of 
the impact of parental welfare receipt on their adult children also usually do not resolve the 
“black box problem”; they provide little guidance about the processes generating any 
generational link in social assistance.  
Researchers have also turned to studying differentials in the extent of intergenerational 
income persistence and welfare dependence as a way of understanding the mechanisms through 
which socioeconomic disadvantage is transmitted across generations. Evidence of substantial 
geographic variation in economic mobility, for example, highlights the importance of the 
institutional context – families, education systems, labor markets, and public policy generally 
– in under-pinning children’s long-term success. Sons’ receipt of unemployment benefits more 
closely mirrors that of their fathers in Canada, which operates an unemployment insurance 
system, than in Sweden, where unemployment benefits are an element of labor market 
adjustment policy (Corak et al. 2004). Moreover, the share of parents’ earnings advantage that 
is passed on to their children differs across wealthy OECD countries (Corak 2006) and there is 
disparity in economic mobility across geographic areas within the United States where welfare 
policy is a state responsibility (Chetty et al. 2014).  
Others have used variation in intergenerational mobility across different family 
structures to illustrate the relative importance of pre- and post-birth environments in the 
transmission of social and economic advantage. In particular, Björklund and his co-authors 
exploit Swedish data that link adopted children to their biological and adoptive parents to 
differentiate between pre-birth factors (influence of biological parents) from post-birth factors 
                                                          
7 Blank (2002), Moffitt (2003) and Grogger and Karoly (2005) review the effects of U.S. welfare reform.  
7 
 
(influence of adoptive parents). They find that both contribute to intergenerational earnings and 
education transmissions (Björklund et al. 2006) and to the intergenerational transmission of 
socioeconomic status more generally (Björklund et al. 2007).  
Similarly, variation over time in the relationship in children’s and parent’s outcomes 
has been used to assess the potential for intergenerational disadvantage to be characterized as 
a causal process rather than merely a spurious correlation. In his seminal paper, Gottschalk 
(1996) presents the conditions under which the correlation between daughters’ current and 
mothers’ future AFDC receipt captures correlation in the determinants of AFDC receipt (i.e.,  
heterogeneity). Comparing this to the overall intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt 
sheds light on the potential role of causal influences. Gottschalk concludes that some 
component of the intergenerational relationship in AFDC receipt is causal. Beaulieu et al. 
(2005) apply Gottschalk’s method and confirm the existence of a significant causal link in 
parents’ and children’s reliance on social assistance in Québec, while Ekhaugen (2009) finds 
that the causal link in intergenerational unemployment in Norway is statistically insignificant 
using both the Gottschalk approach and sibling fixed-effects estimation. 
 In short, disparity in the extent of intergenerational persistence has proven to be useful 
in isolating the pathways linking socioeconomic disadvantage across generations. We make an 
important contribution by being the first to address this issue using variation in 
intergenerational welfare dependence across multiple, highly targeted, social programs within 
a single institutional context.   
 
AUSTRALIAN SOCIAL ASSISTANCE 
Australia is characterized by a regulated labor market with high minimum wages (Bray 2013); 
a health system that provides universal health care through a combination of public and private 
insurance (Glover 2016); an education system with a high degree of choice, privatization, and 
competition (Perry and Southwell 2014); and a social safety net with low, essentially flat-rate, 
entitlement levels that provide universal cash benefits to those in most need (Whiteford 2010). 
Income mobility in Australia appears to be lower than that in much of Europe, but greater than 
that in the United States (d’Addio 2007; Leigh 2007; McLachlan et al. 2013; Mendolia and 
Siminski 2016). 
The primary purpose of Australia’s social security system is to provide people with a 
‘minimum adequate standard of living’ (Australian Treasury 2010 p. 485). The 1991 Social 
Security Act provides the legislative basis for the social security system and social security law 
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is administered by DHS through Centrelink. Responsibility for social policy is shared across a 
number of departments, including the Department of Social Services (DSS), the Department of 
Education and Training, and the Department of Employment. Evidence of intergenerational 
disadvantage first emerged in Australia in the late 1990s when Centrelink data began to be 
linked across generations. Policymakers in DSS were the first to identify that young Australians 
in welfare-dependent families were experiencing many adverse outcomes, the intensity of 
which increased with the extent of parental disadvantage and welfare dependence (McCoull 
and Pech 2000; Pech and McCoull 2000). 
   The Australian social security system is nearly universal for families with children, with 
some payments such as the Child Care Benefit having no income test at all and others, such as 
the Family Tax Benefit, being denied only to families in the top quintile of the income 
distribution.8 At the other extreme are social assistance (welfare) payments that are directed 
towards low-income parents (mainly single parents) or unemployed individuals which are also 
subject to income, asset and/or activity tests. Our focus is exclusively on social assistance. 
Unlike the case in the United States, the Australian social assistance system delivers benefits 
to a broad cross-section of the working-age population through one of several core payments 
outlined in Table 1. Disabled individuals (over the age of 16) receive a Disability Support 
Pension (DSP), while those who have the responsibility of caring for an individual with a 
severe disability can receive the Carer Payment (CP). Low-income families with dependent 
children receive parenting benefits. Single-parent families with at least one child less than 8 
years old are eligible for Parenting Payment Single (PPS), while couple-headed families with 
children under the age of 6 are eligible for Parenting Payment Partnered (PPP). Unemployed 
individuals (over the age of 22) meeting certain activity tests receive unemployment benefits 
in the form of Newstart Allowance (NA).9 Finally, Youth Allowance Jobseeker (YAJ) provides 
support to young adults (under the age of 22) who are unemployed.10  
  
                                                          
8 To place these payments in context, similar benefits in the United States are provided to families through the tax 
system in the form of standard deductions for dependent children and child care rebates.  
9 In contrast to Canada and the United States, which operate unemployment insurance systems, unemployment 
benefits in Australia are a key element of the social assistance system and are paid out of general tax revenue. 
10 Although Youth Allowance also supplements the incomes of young adults who are studying or training – and 
hence is considered to be a social assistance payment by the Australian government – given our focus on social 
and economic disadvantage, we have chosen to report results which exclude Youth Allowance for students and 
apprentices.  
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Table 1: Social Assistance Eligibility Conditions 
 
Payment Eligibility Age  eligibility 
Activity 
tested  
Disability Support Pension 
Permanent diagnosed disability 16 to 
pension 
age 
No Attended program support and cannot 
work for >15h/week for 2 years 
Carer Payment 
In constant daily care for a person 
with severe disability/illness OR who 
is frail aged none 
No 
Care in private home for ≥6 months 
and spend no more than 25h/week 
away from caring 
No 
Parenting Payment Single Principal carer of ≥1 child who is 
≤8years old  none Yes 
Parenting Payment Partnered Principal carer of ≥1 child who is <6years old  none Yes 
Newstart Allowance Unemployed, looking for work, and willing to work 
22 to 
pension 
age 
Yes 
Youth Allowance Jobseeker Looking for full time work or doing approved activities 16 to 22 Yes 
Source: Income Support Payment Description, Australian Department of Human Services.  
 
Australian social assistance is highly targeted. Australia ranks fifth lowest in the OECD 
in terms of the proportion of gross domestic product spent on public social cash transfers 
(OECD 2014a), but close to 80 percent of public social cash spending occurs through income 
and asset-tested benefits – a rate that is nearly three times that in the U.S. and U.K. (OECD 
2014b). All of Australia’s social assistance payments are income and asset tested. 
Unemployment and parenting benefits are also subject to activity tests (e.g., seeking work, 
training, volunteering) (see Table 1). Parenting and carer payments disproportionately flow to 
women, however, all other benefits are largely gender-neutral. Consequently, the rate of social 
assistance receipt among working-age women (36.3 percent) is only 5.6 percentage points 
higher than that among working-age men (30.7 percent) (Tseng and Wilkins 2003, Table 4). 
 
 
DATA 
Australian social security (Centrelink) records provide high-frequency payment information 
for the universe of Australians receiving a broad range of social security payments from the 
government (see above). Our project relies on the 2014 version of the Transgenerational Data 
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Set (TDS) constructed by DSS.11 Specifically, Centrelink records were used to identify all 
young people born between October 1987 and March 1988 who ever had contact with the social 
security system between 1993 (age 5-6) and beginning of 2014 (age 25-26). Young people are 
in the administrative data if they receive benefits themselves. Most, however, are in the data 
because a family member (usually a parent) received at least one Centrelink payment at some 
point between 1993 and 2005 (before they turned 18) which depended in part on his or her 
relationship to the youth. Comparing the number of young adults in these administrative data 
to census data suggests that over 98 percent of young people born between October 1987 and 
March 1988 are included in the TDS data (Breunig et al. 2009). Thus, we can link the social 
assistance receipt of young adults (age 25-26) to that of the families in which they grew up. In 
total, the TDS data includes 126 million fortnightly payments by Centrelink over the 1996-
2014 period. Of these, 29 percent are means-tested social assistance payments, with the 
remaining 71 percent being other types of transfer payments that need not be income- or asset-
tested.   
Matching Youths and Parents 
Our analysis is based on the cohort of individuals born between October 1987 and March 1988 
who we refer to as “youths” or “young people”. We wish to link youths to their parents; 
however, we do not observe biological relationships in our data. Instead, we observe the person 
who had the primary caring responsibility for the youth at every point in time while he or she 
was growing up. We use this information to identify the person with the longest duration of 
primary care responsibility while the youth was a legal minor (i.e., before age 18). In the case 
of ties, we use an algorithm based on gender and age that attempts to identify mothers. This 
allows us to match a unique primary carer to each youth who we refer to as the “parent”. In 
prior research using a subset of our data linked to survey data, this strategy successfully 
identified biological mothers (biological parents) in 96.5 (98.6) percent of cases (Breunig et al. 
2009). Our estimation is based on 124,285 unique matched youth-parent pairs.12 
 
 
                                                          
11 Multiple versions of the TDS have been constructed over the years. The initial TDS was constructed in the 
1990s and was the basis for the early work of DSS staff on intergenerational disadvantage (McCoull and Pech 
2000; Pech and McCoull 2000). In the early 2000s, a second version of the data (TDS2) was created and matched 
to survey data as part of the Youth in Focus (YIF) project which ended in 2008 (Breunig et al. 2009). In 2014, the 
TDS2 data were extended (referred to as TDS2-E) to include updated administrative records for the period 2008-
2014. We utilize TDS2-E data.   
12 Summary statistics about the typical payment and family structure of Social Assistance recipients in our data 
can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix.  
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Social Assistance Measures 
Parental social assistance receipt captures any payments made between June 1, 1996 – when 
the youths are eight years old – and the youths’ 15th birthday (October 1, 2002 – March 31, 
2003) when they become eligible for social assistance in their own right. We only consider 
payments occurring while the parent was actually in primary care of the youth. As there is some 
ambiguity about whether payments to youths aged 15 – 17 are best thought of as payments to 
the young person or his or her family, we adopt a conservative approach and construct measures 
of the social assistance youths receive between their 18th birthdays and the end of our data 
window (January 2, 2014) when they are 25 - 26 years old.  
Using our administrative data, we construct indicator variables separately for youths 
and parents for the receipt of: i) each specific social assistance payment; and ii) any social 
assistance irrespective of type. It is important to note that our indicators for specific social 
assistance payments are not mutually exclusive as young people and their parents may receive 
different benefits at different points in time. We add depth to the analysis by differentiating 
between two types of Disability Support Pension (DSP) payments: i) those for which one of 
the underlying conditions is poor mental health (DSP-M); and ii) those based only on physical 
conditions (DSP-P). In addition to these indicator variables, we also sum payments over time 
to retrieve the total benefits received (in dollars).13  Summary statistics are provided in Table 
2. 
We find that approximately half of parents receive some form of social assistance 
between the youth’s 8th and 15th birthdays. The average parent on social assistance receives 
about $45,000 in total during the youth’s childhood and adolescence, spending three and a half 
years on social assistance. Fully 44.5 percent of young people receive some form of social 
assistance between the time they turn 18 and January 2014 (age 25 – 26). On average, young 
people on social assistance receive about $34,000 and spend just over two years and four 
months on social assistance over this period. Parents are most likely to receive parenting 
payments (PPP and PPS), while youth are most likely to receive unemployment payments in 
the form of YAJ and NA. Conditional on receiving payments, DSP ranks among the most 
intensive form of social assistance in terms of both total dollars received as well as benefit 
duration for both parents and young people. 
 
  
                                                          
13 All dollar amounts are reported in 2013 constant Australian dollars (AUD). 
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Table 2: Average Social Assistance Receipt by Social Assistance Payment 
 
  Ever received: 
 
  If received:  
    in dollars   in weeks 
Payments to Parents (youth between 8-15 years old) 
      
Social Assistance 48.6%  $45,034  191 
   Disability Support Payments 2.2%  $45,255  182 
     DSP Physical 1.4%  $48,522  197 
     DSP Mental 0.6%  $43,461  170 
   Carer Payment 1.2%  $20,492  92 
   Parenting Payment Partnered 27.0%  $23,087  120 
   Parenting Payment Single 28.1%  $49,390  189 
   Newstart Allowance 4.4%  $11,742  49 
   Youth Allowance Jobseeker 0.0%   .  . 
      
Payments to Youth (youth between 18-26 years old) 
      
Social Assistance 44.5%  $34,376  123 
   Disability Support Payments 3.2%  $101,384  294 
     DSP Physical 1.9%  $109,247  327 
     DSP Mental 1.3%  $90,961  248 
   Carer Payment 1.2%  $40,202  102 
   Parenting Payment Partnered 4.6%  $16,487  80 
   Parenting Payment Single 6.7%  $59,870  180 
   Newstart Allowance 29.6%  $17,044  64 
   Youth Allowance Jobseeker 25.1%  $6,855  38 
TDS2, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair observations in 1996-2003 (payments to parents) and 2005-
2014 (payments to youth). 
 
 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Conceptual Framework  
Drawing policy conclusions from patterns in the receipt of social assistance requires a firm 
understanding of what is being measured; or more accurately, that we clearly understand the 
counter-factual. A positive intergenerational correlation in welfare dependence does not imply 
that poor children would have been better off had their parents not received social assistance. 
It is not only that correlation does not imply causation; though that is certainly true. The 
difficulty is that intergenerational correlations typically compare the outcomes of children who 
do and do not grow up in welfare-reliant households with no (or only partial) controls for the 
underlying disadvantage that led to the need for welfare in the first place. This implies that 
13 
 
estimates of social assistance typically confound the beneficial effects of additional financial 
resources with the harmful effects of (uncontrolled) socioeconomic disadvantage.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that – even after accounting for total family income – 
welfare benefits during childhood are associated with lower adult earnings, while family 
income from earnings or assets is associated with higher adult earnings (e.g., Hill and Duncan 
1987; Mayer 1997; Corak and Heisz 1998).  Although an income source, social assistance is 
also linked to broader experiences of disadvantage (e.g., parental disability, single-headed 
households) in ways that market income is not. Once children in welfare-reliant households are 
compared to equally disadvantaged children whose families did not receive welfare, there is 
little evidence that parental social assistance has a detrimental effect on children (Levine and 
Zimmerman 2005). Indeed, there is evidence of beneficial effects. Hoynes et al. (2016), for 
example, find that access to food stamps in childhood results in a significant reduction in 
metabolic syndrome (a set of conditions including obesity, high blood pressure, heart disease, 
and diabetes) and, for women, an increase in economic security.  
We will be unable to identify the effect of childhood poverty separately from the family 
circumstances (e.g., unemployment, family breakdown, parental disability, etc.) that may have 
produced it. Consequently, we will consider various social assistance payments to be markers 
of specific types of disadvantage rather than income streams, allowing us to shed light on the 
intergenerational persistence in different family circumstances.14  
Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy is to compare a series of generational correlations across social 
programs to identify the following: i) the parental social assistance payments most likely to 
result in higher rates (greater intensity) of social assistance receipt among adult children; ii) the 
extent to which the intensity of parental social assistance drives youth outcomes; and iii) the 
specific pathways through which parental and youth social assistance are linked. This allows 
us to infer the mechanisms underpinning intergenerational disadvantage and the extent to 
which there is equality of opportunity.      
Variation across payment types in the degree of generational mobility is particularly 
useful in understanding the mechanisms underlying intergenerational disadvantage. Australian 
social assistance payments fall into three main categories: i) health-related benefits (DSP, CP); 
ii) parenting benefits (PPP, PPS); and iii) unemployment benefits (NA, YAJ). A high 
                                                          
14 See also Weitoft et al. (2008) who make a similar distinction between markers of disadvantage and income 
streams. 
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correlation in parents’ and children’s health-related benefits, for example, indicates that poor 
health is important in linking socioeconomic disadvantage across generations. In contrast, a 
high intergenerational correlation in unemployment or parenting benefits (which respond to 
people’s job search and fertility decisions) points to the role of labor market outcomes and 
family structure in decreasing intergenerational mobility.  
Variation in generational mobility across payment types is also useful in drawing 
inferences about equality of opportunity. First, parental social assistance contributes to the 
“circumstances” that shape the life chances of young people. Smaller generational correlations 
for some payments relative to others point to circumstances in which youths may find it easier 
to overcome childhood disadvantage with increased effort. Second, social assistance payments 
differ in the extent to which they reflect personal choice versus circumstances. Disability 
benefits are largely driven by people’s underlying health conditions (circumstances), while 
unemployment benefits are more closely linked to people’s decisions about education, training, 
prior experience, job search, etc. (personal choice). Parenting payments reflect partnering and 
fertility behavior which can be viewed as capturing both circumstances and personal choice. It 
is important to note that we are not arguing that circumstances (e.g., macroeconomic 
conditions) play no role in driving unemployment benefits. Nor are we claiming that there is 
no capacity for personal choice (e.g., smoking behavior) to affect health-related benefits.15 We 
are, however, of the view that personal choice and circumstances are not equally important 
drivers of health-, parenting- and unemployment-related disadvantage. To the extent that this 
is true, comparing intergenerational correlations across payment types also sheds light on the 
relative importance of circumstances versus personal choice in understanding intergenerational 
disadvantage.16  
Lastly, we use the eligibility rules for certain social assistance programs to draw 
inferences about young people’s life course trajectories; unemployed youths receive YAJ only 
until the age of 22, qualifying for NA afterwards. Any disparity in the generational correlations 
between YAJ and NA thus point to a differential effect of family social assistance on outcomes 
in late adolescence (18 to 22) versus early adulthood (23 to 26).  
 
 
                                                          
15 Mental health may be the result of individual effort in, say, avoiding substance abuse and addiction (Jusot et al. 
2013). Still, mental disorders are medical conditions often thought to affect the ability to be responsible for one’s 
decisions. 
16 Jusot et al. (2013) adopt a similar reasoning when using variance decomposition methods to isolate the relative 
contributions of effort and circumstances to health inequality.  
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Youth Social Assistance and the Nature of Parental Benefits  
We begin by focusing on two related questions. Which parental benefits are associated with 
the highest rate of social assistance receipt among their adult children? Are these the same 
benefits that are associated with the greatest intensity of youth social assistance? To answer 
these questions, we estimate the generational correlation in social assistance receipt for parents 
and their adult children using two alternative models. First, we model the likelihood that young 
people receive any social assistance. Specifically, Pr (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦 = 1) = 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,   (1) 
where i indexes youth-parent pairs, 𝑝𝑝 denotes parents, 𝑦𝑦 denotes youths and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝑦𝑦 is 
an indicator that equals one if the youth received any social assistance payments between the 
ages of 18 and 26; and 0 otherwise. Moreover, 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃 is an indicator that equals one if 
the parent ever received any social assistance of type 𝑗𝑗 before the youth turned 15; and zero 
otherwise. The vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 denotes a parsimonious set of controls including a constant, indicators 
of gender and Aboriginal status for both youth and parents, and indicators of parents’ age at 
birth to control for life-cycle effects. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is an independently-distributed error and all 
other terms are parameters to be estimated.  
  Equation (1) is estimated separately for each payment type j (including any social 
assistance receipt) using a linear probability model.  The results are reported in the form of 
conditional predicted probabilities; that is, the probability that the youth received any social 
assistance given their parent did and did not receive benefit 𝑗𝑗 (see Table 3). These predicted 
probabilities are obtained by estimating Equation (1) and averaging its fitted values evaluated 
at 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑝𝑝 = 1 and 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 = 0, respectively. The difference in these predicted 
probabilities equals 𝛽𝛽𝚥𝚥� ; smaller differences imply lower intergenerational correlations. We refer 
to these differences as “generational correlations” in social assistance receipt.17 
Second, we repeat the analysis focusing on the total dollar amount youths receive in 
social assistance (𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
𝑦𝑦). Specifically,  
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
𝑦𝑦 = ?̅?𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 + ?̅?𝛾𝑗𝑗′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑗 .   (2) 
We use our estimates to construct the predicted level of social assistance received by young 
people whose parents did and did not receive payment 𝑗𝑗 in Table 4. Analogous to the model in 
                                                          
17 Following Page (2004) it is possible to use 𝛽𝛽𝚥𝚥�  to retrieve intergenerational correlation coefficients that account 
for the disparity in the distribution of social assistance in parents’ and children’s generations. For ease of 
interpretation, however, we report the results in the form of conditional predicted probabilities. We report the 
underlying regression results in tables A.3 to A.5 in the Appendix.  
16 
 
Equation (1), the coefficient ?̅?𝛽𝚥𝚥�  is the difference in the predicted level of social assistance for 
these two groups of young people. Equation (1) allows us to analyze the relationship between 
parental benefits and the incidence of social assistance among young people, while Equation 
(2) allows us to investigate how the intensity of youth social assistance varies with the type of 
benefits parents received. 
Youth Social Assistance and the Amount of Parental Benefits  
To what extent is young people’s reliance on social assistance linked to the amount of social 
assistance their parents received? This question can be addressed by decomposing our 
generational correlations into two components: i) an extensive margin (i.e., whether parents 
receive any social assistance); and ii) an intensive margin (i.e., how much social assistance 
parents received). This results in the following extension of the estimation models given in 
Equations (1) and (2): Pr (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦 = 1) = 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼(𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 ) + 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑗    (3a)                   𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦 =  ?̅?𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 + ?̅?𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼(𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 ) + ?̅?𝛾�𝑗𝑗′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀̅?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑗 , (3b) 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑝𝑝  is a measure of the total amount of assistance received by the youth’s parent 
for benefit type 𝑗𝑗. In the above model, the effects of a one-unit change in the amount of benefit 
j that parents receive on the incidence and intensity of youths’ social assistance are given by  𝛽𝛽𝚥𝚥𝐼𝐼�  and ?̅?𝛽𝚥𝚥𝐼𝐼�, respectively. Correspondingly, 𝛽𝛽𝚥𝚥𝐸𝐸�  and ?̅?𝛽𝚥𝚥𝐸𝐸�  capture the changes in youth outcomes 
that are associated with parents receiving a very small amount (essentially zero) of benefit 𝑗𝑗.  
The Pathways Linking Parental and Youth Social Assistance 
Which are the most important pathways linking parental and youth social assistance? We 
answer this question by estimating the effect of parents’ receipt of specific payments on the 
type of social assistance youths receive. Specifically, we construct an indicator 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑦𝑦  
that takes the value one if the youth receives payment 𝑘𝑘; and zero otherwise. We then estimate 
the following equation: 
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑦𝑦 = ?̌?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 + 𝛾𝛾�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̌?𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗.     (4) 
As before, for each of these regressions we report the predicted probability of youths receiving 
benefit 𝑘𝑘 if their parents did and did not receive benefit 𝑗𝑗 (Table 5). The difference between 
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these conditional probabilities identifies β�kȷ, the cross-payment generational correlation in 
social assistance.18 
 
 
RESULTS 
Youth Social Assistance and the Nature of Parental Benefits  
We begin by considering the way that youths’ receipt of any social assistance – regardless of 
its form – between the ages of 18 and 26 varies with the type of benefits (if any) their families 
received while they were growing up. Table 3 shows the predicted incidence (in percentages) 
of youths receiving any social assistance given that their parents did and did not receive specific 
types of social assistance while they were growing up. Our preferred estimates account for 
differences in demographic characteristics (Columns 4 and 5), though in most cases they are 
very similar to our unconditional estimates (Columns 1 and 2). These estimates allow us to 
compare the ratio in social assistance receipt between youths whose parents received a specific 
benefit and youths whose parents did not receive the same payment (Columns 3 and 6). 
There is an intergenerational correlation in social assistance. Young people have a 58.0 percent 
chance of receiving social assistance between the ages of 18 and 26 if their parents received 
any social assistance while they were growing up (Column 5). Given that the baseline 
probability of social assistance receipt is 31.8 percent for young people with no family history 
of social assistance (Column 4), this estimate implies that young people’s likelihood of 
receiving social assistance is nearly twice (1.8 times) as high if their parents received social 
assistance than if they did not. In comparison, Page (2004 p. 231) estimates that U.S. women 
are 2.8 times as likely to receive welfare if their mothers also received welfare, while Stenberg 
(2000, Table 1, p. 231) estimates that in Sweden the likelihood of adults receiving social 
assistance is approximately 2.5 times higher if their families received social assistance while 
they were growing up. 
The extent to which social assistance is linked across generations depends on the nature 
of those benefits, however. The relationship is particularly strong in the case of single-parent 
payments (PPS), disability payments (DSP), and carer payments (CP): The likelihood of youths 
receiving social assistance is 1.6 times larger if their parents received any of these three 
payments than if they did not. In contrast, partnered-parent payments and unemployment  
                                                          
18 All our parameter estimates are very precisely estimated. To minimize the notational burden on the tables, we 
only provide measures of our estimates’ uncertainty in the Appendix. 
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Table 3: Incidence of Youth Social Assistance 
 
 Predicted probabilities of social assistance incidence among 
youth given… 
 no 
parental 
receipt 
parental 
receipt Ratio  
no 
parental 
receipt 
parental 
receipt Ratio 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Social Assistance 30.2% 59.6% 2.0  31.8% 58.0% 1.8 
         
   Disability Support Pension 43.9% 71.8% 1.6  44.0% 68.3% 1.6 
     DSP-Physical 44.1% 72.9% 1.7  44.2% 69.1% 1.6 
     DSP-Mental 44.4% 72.3% 1.6  44.4% 69.1% 1.6 
   Carer Payment 44.2% 72.0% 1.6  44.2% 68.6% 1.6 
         
   Parenting Payment Partnered  39.5% 58.2% 1.5  40.3% 56.0% 1.4 
   Parenting Payment Single  36.8% 64.4% 1.8  37.8% 61.8% 1.6 
         
   Newstart Allowance 43.5% 66.8% 1.5  43.9% 59.1% 1.3 
Demographics    
TDS2, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair observations in 1996-2003 (payments to parents) and 2005-
2014 (payments to youth). Conditional predicted probabilities from OLS regressions, separately for each row 
parental payment. Underlying estimates reported in Table A.3 (Columns 1 and 2) in the Appendix. 
 
 
payments are associated with rates of social assistance receipt among young people that 
are only 1.3 – 1.4 times higher.  
The extent to which social assistance is linked across generations depends on the nature 
of those benefits, however. The relationship is particularly strong in the case of single-parent 
payments (PPS), disability payments (DSP), and carer payments (CP): The likelihood of youths 
receiving social assistance is 1.6 times larger if their parents received any of these three 
payments than if they did not. In contrast, partnered-parent payments and unemployment 
payments are associated with rates of social assistance receipt among young people that are 
only 1.3 – 1.4 times higher.  
It is important to note that these within-payment generational correlations ignore the 
influence of cross-payment correlations in parents’ and youths’ social assistance receipt. Some 
parents who did not receive single-parent payments (PPS), for example, did receive other forms 
of social assistance. We can shed light on how much this matters by considering the outcomes 
of young people whose parents never received any social assistance. Less than one third (31.8 
percent) of youths without any family history of social assistance receive social assistance 
benefits themselves between the ages of 18 and 26. The rate of social assistance for young 
people growing up on PPS is nearly twice (1.9 times) as high – much higher than the 1.6 ratio 
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that results when the comparison is to youths whose families did not receive PPS. Similar 
patterns arise when considering other social assistance types.   
We turn now to consider whether there is any evidence that the intensity of youth social 
assistance varies with the type of benefits their families received before they turned 15.  To this 
end, we replicate the above analysis focusing instead on the total amount of social assistance 
that young people received between the ages of 18 and 26. Results are presented as predicted 
total dollar amounts given that parents did and did not receive social assistance (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Intensity of Youth Social Assistance 
 
 Predicted dollar amounts of social assistance among youth 
given… 
 no 
parental 
receipt 
parental 
receipt Ratio  
no 
parental 
receipt 
parental 
receipt Ratio 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Social Assistance $7,481 $23,579 3.2  $9,190 $21,774 2.4 
        
   Disability Support Pension $14,816 $37,027 2.5  $14,875 $34,461 2.3 
     DSP-Physical $14,993 $37,169 2.5  $15,033 $34,392 2.3 
     DSP-Mental $15,156 $39,153 2.6  $15,172 $36,794 2.4 
   Carer Payment $15,055 $35,656 2.4  $15,095 $32,505 2.2 
        
   Parenting Payment Partnered  $12,772 $22,189 1.7  $13,508 $20,196 1.5 
   Parenting Payment Single  $10,311 $28,090 2.7  $11,381 $25,356 2.2 
        
   Newstart Allowance $14,563 $31,488 2.2  $14,873 $24,797 1.7 
Demographics    
TDS2, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair observations in 1996-2003 (payments to parents) and 2005-
2014 (payments to youth). Conditional predicted probabilities from OLS regressions, separately for each row 
parental payment. Underlying estimates reported in Table A.4 (Columns 1 and 2) in the Appendix. 
 
 
Young people with no family history of social assistance receive on average $9,190 
(Column 4) in social assistance payments between the ages of 18 and 26. In contrast, social 
assistance payments during these ages average more than $20,000 (Column 5) for those young 
people whose parents also received social assistance at some point before they turned 15. This 
more than two-fold gap in payments indicates that young people are not only more likely to 
need social assistance if their parents have a history of receiving social benefits; they also need 
more intensive support. This is particularly true in families receiving disability payments (DSP) 
or single-parent payments (PPS). Young people growing up with parents who received 
disability mental health payments (DSP-M), for example, receive 2.4 times the amount of 
social assistance as their peers growing up in families not receiving them, and four times the 
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social assistance received by youths with no family history of social assistance at all. In 
contrast, unemployment (NA) and partnered-parent (PPP) benefits are less strongly linked to 
the intensity of youths’ social benefits. Youths receive 1.5 (1.7) times as much assistance if 
their parents received partnered-parent (unemployment) benefits than if they did not.    
Youth Social Assistance and the Amount of Parental Benefits  
Thus far, we have distinguished parental social assistance only by an indicator of whether a 
parent received a particular benefit at all. We now turn to investigating whether the generational 
correlation in social assistance is related to the amount of social assistance that parents receive. 
To address this issue, we re-estimate our model adding a control for the amount (in dollars) of 
social assistance received by parents (see Equations 3a and 3b). This effectively allows us to 
decompose the estimated effect of parental social assistance reported in Tables 3 and 4 into its 
extensive and intensive margins. The former captures the effect of parents receiving an 
infinitesimally small amount of benefit j, while the latter reflects the influence of the total dollar 
amount of benefit j received. To facilitate interpretation, we present the key results graphically; 
the incidence of youth social assistance is decomposed in Figure 1, while the intensity of youth 
social assistance is decomposed in Figure 2.19 In both cases, the blue bars reproduce outcomes 
for those young people whose parents’ never received benefit j (see Column 4 of Tables 3 and 
4). The extensive margin is shown in purple, while the intensive margin is shown in pink. If 
parental social assistance was random – and therefore unrelated to family circumstances – we 
would expect the extensive margin of social assistance to have no effect on youth outcomes at 
all. Disparity in the two reflects the effect of unaccounted-for differences between families that 
do and do not access the social safety net. Finally, the sum of the extensive and intensive 
margins in Figure 1 (Figure 2) equals the overall effect of parents’ social assistance on the 
incidence of youth’s social assistance in Column 5 of Tables 3 (intensity; Table 4).  
We find that the chances that young people will require social assistance are more 
closely related to whether their parents received any social assistance at all than to the amount. 
Recall that the probability of youths receiving any type of social assistance is 31.8 percent if 
their parents did not receive social assistance and 58.0 percent if they did (see Table 3). Fully 
44.0 percentage points of this 58.0 percent is explained by the incidence of parental social 
assistance (purple bar); in effect, a small amount of parental social assistance is associated with 
a substantial increase in the incidence of social assistance for young people. Only 14.0 
percentage points are attributable to the intensity of social assistance parents receive (pink bar). 
                                                          
19 Complete estimation results are available in tables A.3 to A.5 in the Appendix. 
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This pattern continues to hold across social assistance types (see Figure 1). Indeed, the intensity 
of disability mental health payments (DSP-M) is statistically unrelated to the probability that 
young people receive social assistance. Thus, irrespective of the nature of parental benefits, the 
presence of any social assistance income in the childhood household is more important than 
the amount in understanding the chances that young adults receive social assistance.     
 
Figure 1: Incidence of Youth Social Assistance and the Amount of Parental Benefits 
 
 
TDS2, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair observations in 1996-2003 (payments to parents) and 2005-
2014 (payments to youth). Conditional predicted probabilities from OLS regressions, separately for each parental 
payment as covariate. The extensive margin is computed as the predicted probability conditional on parental 
receipt but evaluated at zero-dollar receipt of the parents; the intensive margin is the estimated increase in 
probability for every additional dollar in parental receipt multiplied by the average amount among recipient 
parents. Underlying estimates reported in Table A.3 (Columns 3 and 4) in the Appendix. 
 
In general, the intensity of parental social assistance matters more when we turn our 
focus to the amount of social assistance young people receive between the ages of 18 and 26 
(see Figure 2). Approximately one third of the overall effect of parental disability payments 
(DSP) – in particular physical disability (DSP-P) – and single-parent payments (PPS) on the 
amount of social assistance that young people receive is due to the intensive margin of parental 
social assistance. This amounts to $7,809 – $11,519 in social assistance for these payments. In 
contrast, the amount of social assistance that youths receive is largely unrelated to the intensive 
margin of disability mental health (DSP-M), carer (CP), partnered-parent (PPP), and 
unemployment (NA) payments. Overall, we find that the amount of social assistance a parent 
received explains almost half of the amount the youth receives. 
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Figure 2: Intensity of Youth Social Assistance and the Amount of Parental Benefits 
 
 
TDS2, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair observations in 1996-2003 (payments to parents) and 2005-
2014 (payments to youth). Conditional predicted dollar amounts from OLS regressions, separately for each 
parental payment as covariate. The extensive margin is computed as the predicted dollar amount conditional on 
parental receipt but evaluated at zero-dollar receipt of the parents; the intensive margin is the estimated increase 
in dollars for every additional dollar in parental receipt multiplied by the average amount among recipient parents. 
Underlying estimates reported in Table A.4 (Columns 3 and 4) in the Appendix. 
 
 
The Pathways Linking Parental and Youth Social Assistance 
Thus far, our focus has been on patterns in the incidence and intensity of youths’ receipt of 
social assistance overall. We now turn to investigating the generational correlations within and 
across specific social assistance benefits in order to identify the potential channels through 
which disadvantage is being passed from one generation to the next.  
Information on the intergenerational link in specific forms of social assistance is 
reported in Table 5. The predicted probability that a youth receives a (column) benefit given 
their parent did not receive a specific (row) benefit can be found in the top panel. The 
corresponding predicted probabilities given families did receive specific benefits are shown in 
the bottom panel. Diagonal cells contain information about within-benefit correlations; off-
diagonal cells capture correlations across benefit types. The first column and row correspond 
to the receipt of any social assistance, irrespective of its form, while subsequent rows and 
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columns relate to specific payments.20 In addition to the benefits considered previously, we 
differentiate early unemployment payments (YAJ, under the age of 22) from regular 
unemployment payments (NA, aged 22 and older). We focus our discussion on cell-by-cell 
comparisons across the top and bottom panels which shed light on the extent to which social 
assistance is linked across generations. If young people’s social assistance were unrelated to 
that of their parents, we would expect the predicted probabilities in the top and bottom panel 
of Table 5 to be the same; that is, their ratio would be one. Higher ratios indicate greater 
intergenerational correlation. 
Let us first consider the intergenerational relationship in disability payments (DSP). 
Young people are 2.8 times as likely to receive disability support payments if their parents also 
received disability support payments (8.8 percent, row 2, column 2, bottom panel) than if they 
did not (3.1 percent, row 2, column 2, top panel). This correlation stems from an increased 
incidence of both physical (3.0 times) and mental health-related (2.5 times) disability 
associated with their parents’ receipt of the same benefits. Dahl et al. (2014) and Dahl and 
Gielen (2016) also provide evidence of an intergenerational relationship in the take up of 
disability benefits in Norway and the Netherlands. Moreover, the consequences of parental 
disability – particularly when related to mental health issues – is linked not just to higher rates 
of youth disability, but also a greater need for a range of social assistance payments. Young 
people, for example, are nearly six times more likely to have received carer payment (CP) if 
their parents received disability mental health (DSP-M) payments (6.7 percent) than if they did 
not (1.1 percent). They are fully 12 times more likely to have received a carer payment (CP) 
than those young people whose parents received no social assistance at all. Overall, parental 
disability is associated with rates of parenting payments (both single-parent (PPS) and 
partnered-parent (PPP)) and unemployment benefits (both early unemployment (YAJ) and 
regular unemployment (NA)) that are 1.4 – 1.9 times larger when families not receiving those 
social assistance types are the benchmark. These ratios become even larger when we compare 
these outcomes with those of young people in families with no history of any social assistance. 
Interestingly, the intergenerational relationship between parental disability (DSP) and youth 
unemployment (NA) is as strong as the intergenerational relationship between parental and 
youth unemployment.  
                                                          
20 All results control for demographic characteristics. Results in Column 1 of the top (bottom) panel are identical 
to those in Column 3 (4) of Table 3. 
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Unlike the United States, Australia directs social assistance towards low-income families with 
young children irrespective of whether they are headed by single parents or couples. We find 
evidence that parenting benefits are linked across generations, particularly in single-parent 
families. Specifically, young people are 1.7 times more likely to receive partnered-parent 
payments (PPP) if their parents also received them. In contrast, their chances of receiving 
single-parent payments are 2.2 times greater (11.1 vs. 5.1 percent) when their families also 
receive single-parent payments. This is consistent with U.S. evidence that children of separated 
parents are twice as likely to become single parents themselves (McLanahan and Sandefur 
1994) and that welfare benefits for single mothers are correlated across generations (Hartley et 
al. 2017).21 Unlike the case for disability payments, the intergenerational consequences of 
parents’ receipt of PPP is largely confined to youths’ increased chances of receiving parenting 
payments (either PPP or PPS). The incidence of disability (DSP) and unemployment (NA) 
payments is only 1.3 times higher if young people’s parents received PPP than if they did not. 
In contrast, the disadvantage associated with growing up in a family receiving single parent 
benefits appears more pervasive and broad-based; young people are twice as likely to receive 
mental health related disability payments (DSP-M), and 1.5 (NA) – 2.3 (YAJ) as likely to 
receive unemployment benefits if their parents received single-parent payments (PPS) than if 
they did not.  
Young people are more likely to receive social assistance in the form of unemployment 
benefits between the ages of 18 and 26 if their parents also received unemployment benefits. 
The intergenerational relationship in unemployment benefits is stronger at younger rather than 
older ages. Specifically, young people are 1.6 (1.3) times more likely to receive unemployment 
benefits before (after) age 22 if their parents received unemployment benefits while they were 
growing up. These estimates of the intergenerational correlation in unemployment are broadly 
similar to those found for men in Canada and Sweden (Corak et al. 2004 p. 255).  Moreover, 
the generational correlation in unemployment benefits is similar in magnitude to that between 
parental unemployment and young people’s receipt of parenting (1.5 times) and carer payments 
(1.8 times). In contrast, young people are only somewhat more likely (1.2 times) to receive 
disability payments if their parents received unemployment-related social assistance.   
  
                                                          
21 Research also shows that family dissolution in childhood increases the chances of divorce and fertility patterns 
(including non-marital and early childbirth) are often reproduced across generations (Wolfinger 2000; Barber 
2001; Li and Wu 2008; Högnäs and Carlson 2012; Diekmann and Schmidheiny 2013). Both are linked to single 
parenthood. 
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Table 5: Cross Payment Predicted Probabilities of Youth Incidence by Parental Receipt 
 
 Probability of incidence among youth (column payment): predicted probability conditional on parental receipt (row payment) equal to 0 
 SA DSP DSP-P DSP-M CP PPP PPS NA YAJ 
SA 31.8% 2.2% 1.3% 0.8% 0.5% 3.0% 4.4% 22.9% 13.0% 
DSP 44.0% 3.1% 1.8% 1.3% 1.1% 4.5% 6.6% 29.4% 24.6% 
DSP-P 44.2% 3.2% 1.9% 1.3% 1.1% 4.6% 6.7% 29.4% 24.8% 
DSP-M 44.4% 3.2% 1.9% 1.3% 1.1% 4.6% 6.7% 29.5% 25.0% 
CP 44.2% 3.2% 1.8% 1.3% 1.1% 4.6% 6.7% 29.5% 24.9% 
PPP  40.3% 3.0% 1.8% 1.2% 1.0% 3.9% 6.0% 27.3% 21.3% 
PPS  37.8% 2.6% 1.6% 1.0% 0.8% 3.8% 5.1% 26.0% 18.3% 
NA 43.9% 3.2% 1.9% 1.3% 1.1% 4.5% 6.6% 29.2% 24.5% 
 
 Probability of incidence among youth (column payment): predicted probability conditional on parental receipt (row payment) equal to 1 
 SA DSP DSP-P DSP-M CP PPP PPS NA YAJ 
SA 58.0% 4.3% 2.5% 1.8% 1.8% 6.3% 9.2% 36.7% 38.0% 
DSP 68.3% 8.8% 5.6% 3.0% 5.5% 9.1% 11.8% 39.3% 46.9% 
DSP-P 69.1% 8.8% 5.5% 3.0% 5.5% 9.9% 12.6% 39.3% 47.6% 
DSP-M 69.1% 9.7% 6.3% 3.3% 6.7% 8.2% 10.5% 40.5% 47.4% 
CP 68.6% 9.5% 6.8% 2.5% 3.9% 7.7% 11.0% 39.0% 44.8% 
PPP  56.0% 3.9% 2.3% 1.5% 1.6% 6.6% 8.7% 35.7% 35.6% 
PPS  61.8% 4.8% 2.7% 2.0% 2.1% 6.8% 11.1% 38.9% 42.6% 
NA 59.1% 4.0% 2.2% 1.8% 2.0% 7.0% 10.4% 39.0% 39.9% 
TDS2, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair observations in 1996-2003 (payments to parents) and 2005-2014 (payments to youth). Each cell indicates the predicted 
probability of youth receiving a particular payment (column) conditional on parents either receiving (top panel) or not receiving (bottom panel) another particular payment 
(row). Basic demographic characteristics are accounted for. Abbreviations: Social Assistance (SA), Disability Support Pension (DSP), DSP-Physical (DSP-P), DSP-Mental 
(DSP-M), Carer Payment (CP), Parenting Payment Partnered (PPP), Parenting Payment Single (PPS), Newstart Allowance (NA), Youth Allowance Jobseeker (YAJ). 
Underlying estimates reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix. 
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POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
Growing up in a family on social assistance is a marker for compromised long-term 
development (Weitoft et al. 2008). Our results highlight that there are large intergenerational 
correlations across a range of social assistance programs and thus provide compelling evidence 
that social and economic disadvantage is being passed from parents to their children. We are 
led to a number of conclusions. 
Despite Australia’s universal health care system, parental disability, especially when 
related to mental illness or substance abuse, appears to play a substantial role in limiting young 
adults’ life chances. The issue is not only that young people’s chances of needing disability 
support are much greater when their parents receive disability support – raising the possibility 
that disability itself may be linked across generations – but also that any childhood 
disadvantage stemming from parental disability is strongly linked to a broad spectrum of adult 
disadvantage. In particular, the six-fold increase in caring responsibilities for those youth 
whose parents received disability mental health payments (DSP-M), suggests that young adults 
may now be caring for their disabled parents. Parental disability also appears to be associated 
with diminished labor market opportunities as evidenced by a heightened need for 
unemployment benefits. In fact, the intergenerational link between parents’ disability and 
youths’ unemployment is as strong as that between parents’ and youths’ unemployment, 
suggesting that disability may undermine parents’ ability to invest in their children’s human 
capital.  
Family structure also matters for intergenerational disadvantage. Young adults are 
much more likely to experience social and economic disadvantage if they grow up in single- 
rather than couple-headed families receiving parenting benefits. As single-parent (PPS) and 
partnered-parent (PPP) payments both provide financial assistance to low-income families 
raising young children, any disparity in disadvantage associated with growing up on one type 
of parenting payment rather than the other are likely to reflect the consequences of living with 
one rather than two parents. These results are consistent with the voluminous literature 
documenting the negative consequences of growing up in a single-parent family (see 
McLanahan and Sandefur 1994 and McLanahan 1997 for reviews).     
Other forms of disadvantage, in particular those stemming from parents’ poor labor 
market outcomes, seem to be easier for young people to overcome. Young people are only 
somewhat more likely to experience social and economic disadvantage if they grow up in 
families receiving unemployment (NA) or partnered-parent (PPP) payments than if their 
families received no social assistance at all. Moreover, parental disadvantage is more strongly 
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related to youth unemployment between the ages of 18 and 22 than at older ages suggesting 
that, at least with respect to unemployment, the relative labor market outcomes of 
disadvantaged youth improve as they mature. Perhaps unemployment (or underemployment) 
imposes fewer constraints than disability does on parents’ ability to invest in their children. 
Alternatively, activity testing parenting and unemployment benefits may help prevent the 
transmission of disadvantage from parents to children. 
In general, it is also the case that long-term exposure to social assistance as a child does 
not have the compounding effects on youth disadvantage that we might expect. Young people 
are only somewhat more likely to require social assistance – or require more intensive 
assistance – as adults if their parents received benefits over an extensive rather than a trivially 
short period of time. The fact that what matters is not how much social assistance families 
receive, but rather that they receive any at all, argues against the existence of a widespread 
welfare culture in which values are shaped and disadvantage becomes increasingly entrenched. 
Moreover, the financial resources provided through Australia’s myriad of social assistance 
programs appear to be largely successful in preventing children experiencing long-term 
disadvantage from falling even further behind.  Given this, there is little to suggest that a large-
scale redesign of the social assistance system is warranted. 
At the same time, the substantial cross-program correlation in the benefits that parents 
and young adults receive highlights the fact that parental disadvantage can have broad ranging 
consequences. It is not simply the case that unemployment begets unemployment or that 
disability begets disability. Studies with a narrow focus on the correlation in a single benefit 
are likely to understate the extent of intergenerational disadvantage.     
It is also apparent that the playing field is not level for all children. Young adults’ 
fortunes are closely linked to those of the families into which they are born.  Moreover, there 
is a clear relationship between the extent to which parental disadvantage is transferred to 
children, on the one hand, and the relative importance of circumstances rather than personal 
choice in driving that disadvantage, on the other. Intergenerational disadvantage is most 
evident in the case of health-related parental disadvantage (largely attributable to 
circumstances) and least evident when parents experience unemployment-related disadvantage 
(more likely the result of personal choice). Thus, disparities in young people’s outcomes are 
not simply the result of their – or their parents’ – differential efforts; unequal opportunities also 
play a critical role.  Greater policy effort must be devoted to leveling the playing field for 
children growing up in particularly vulnerable families.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Median Amounts, Modal Family Structure, and Numbers of Payments by Social 
Assistance Program 
 
  Median amount  Family structure  Number of    Adults Children  payments 
Disability Support Payments  $589.66  1 0  8,632,913 
  DSP-Physical  $574.11  1 0  5,539,568 
  DSP-Mental  $626.74  1 0  2,985,347 
Carer Payment  $577.24  2 0  1,958,448 
Parenting Payment Partnered   $446.01  2 2  4,772,534 
Parenting Payment Single  $566.81  1 2  10,743,092 
Newstart Allowance  $495.76  1 0  8,653,805 
Youth Allowance Jobseeker  $269.47  1 0  1,455,311 
TDS2-E, entire dataset, years 1996 to 2014. Median amount is per fortnightly payment and is not including 
zeroes. Family structure retrieved from annual information on the modal recipient. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Mean Demographic Characteristics 
 
 Mean  Std. Dev. 
Youth       
Female 0.488  0.500 
Aboriginal 0.043  0.202 
     
Parents    
Female 0.923  0.266 
Aboriginal 0.035  0.183 
Age at birth 27.555  5.484 
TDS2-E, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair 
observations. 
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Table A.3: Underlying Estimates for the Incidence of Youth Social Assistance (Table 3), and 
the Incidence of Youth Social Assistance and the Amount of Parental Benefits (Figure 1) 
 
Outcome variable: Incidence dummy for youth social assistance (regressed on parental payment) 
  Extensive   Extensive and intensive 
  Receipt   Receipt   Receipt Dollar 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Social Assistance 0.294  0.261  0.126 0.031 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) (0.001) 
       
   Disability Support Pension 0.279  0.243  0.204 0.009 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.015) (0.003) 
     DSP-Physical 0.287  0.249  0.204 0.009 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.019) (0.003) 
     DSP-Mental 0.279  0.248  0.245 0.000 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.027) (0.005) 
   Carer Payment 0.278  0.244  0.218 0.013 
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.017) (0.006) 
       
   Parenting Payment Partnered  0.186  0.157  0.092 0.028 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) (0.001) 
   Parenting Payment Single  0.276  0.240  0.143 0.020 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.001) 
       
   Newstart Allowance 0.233  0.152  0.134 0.016 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) (0.004) 
Demographics       
TDS2, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair observations in 1996-2003 (payments to parents) and 2005-
2014 (payments to youth). Each cell in columns (1) and (2) contains a coefficient from a separate OLS regression 
of the youth Social Assistance incidence dummy on the parental row payment incidence dummy. Columns (3) 
and (4) contain OLS coefficients from separate OLS regressions by row of the youth Social Assistance incidence 
dummy on the parental row payment incidence dummy (column 3) and the parental total amount received in row 
payment in $10,000 (column 4).  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.4: Underlying Estimates for the Intensity of Youth Social Assistance (Table 4), and 
the Incidence of Youth Social Assistance and the Amount of Parental Benefits (Figure 2) 
 
Outcome variable: Total dollar amount (in $10,000) of youth social assistance (regressed on parental 
payment) 
  Extensive   Extensive and intensive 
  Receipt   Receipt   Receipt Dollar 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Social Assistance 1.610  1.258  0.203 0.242 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.023) (0.005) 
       
   Disability Support Pension 2.221  1.959  1.030 0.206 
 (0.093)  (0.092)  (0.145) (0.028) 
     DSP-Physical 2.218  1.936  0.785 0.237 
 (0.116)  (0.114)  (0.182) (0.033) 
     DSP-Mental 2.400  2.162  1.722 0.101 
 (0.178)  (0.174)  (0.296) (0.057) 
   Carer Payment 2.060  1.741  1.546 0.095 
 (0.121)  (0.117)  (0.163) (0.058) 
       
   Parenting Payment Partnered  0.942  0.669  0.394 0.119 
 (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.029) (0.009) 
   Parenting Payment Single  1.778  1.397  0.624 0.158 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.036) (0.006) 
       
   Newstart Allowance 1.692  0.992  0.778 0.186 
 (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.074) (0.040) 
Demographics       
TDS2, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair observations in 1996-2003 (payments to parents) and 2005-
2014 (payments to youth). Each cell in columns (1) and (2) contains a coefficient from a separate OLS regression 
of the youth total dollar amount in Social Assistance in $10,000 on the parental row payment dummy. Columns 
(3) and (4) contain OLS coefficients from separate OLS regressions by row of the youth total dollar amount in 
Social Assistance in $10,000 on the parental row payment dummy (column 3) and the parental total amount 
received in row payment in $10,000 (column 4).  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.5: Underlying estimates for the Cross payment predicted probabilities of youth incidence by parental receipt (Table 5) 
 
 Outcome: incidence among youth (column payment), displayed: regression coefficients of particular parental receipt (row payment) 
 SA DSP DSP-P DSP-M CP PPP PPS NA YAJ 
SA 0.261 0.021 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.033 0.047 0.138 0.250 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
DSP 0.243 0.057 0.038 0.018 0.045 0.046 0.052 0.099 0.222 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
DSP-P 0.249 0.056 0.037 0.017 0.044 0.053 0.059 0.098 0.228 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
DSP-M 0.248 0.065 0.044 0.020 0.055 0.036 0.038 0.110 0.224 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) 
CP 0.244 0.064 0.050 0.013 0.028 0.030 0.043 0.095 0.199 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) 
PPP  0.157 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.027 0.026 0.084 0.143 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
PPS  0.240 0.022 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.030 0.060 0.129 0.243 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
NA 0.152 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.025 0.039 0.098 0.154 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
TDS2, analysis sample. 124,285 parent-youth pair observations in 1996-2003 (payments to parents) and 2005-2014 (payments to youth). Each cell indicates a coefficient 
from a separate OLS estimation of the youth column payment dummy regressed on the parental row payment dummy. Standard errors in parentheses. Basic demographic 
characteristics are accounted for. Abbreviations: Social Assistance (SA), Disability Support Pension (DSP), DSP-Physical (DSP-P), DSP-Mental (DSP-M), Carer Payment 
(CP), Parenting Payment Partnered (PPP), Parenting Payment Single (PPS), Newstart Allowance (NA), Youth Allowance Jobseeker (YAJ). 
 
